Test mail server connectivity per RFC 5321, TLS encryption, open relay status, MTA-STS, DANE, and PTR records. Get a graded security report for any domain in real time.
Written by Ishan Karunaratne · Last reviewed:
SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol), defined in RFC 5321, is the standard protocol for transferring email between mail servers. When someone sends an email to your domain, their mail server resolves your MX records, opens a TCP connection to your SMTP server on port 25, and delivers the message through a series of commands (EHLO, MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, DATA).
SMTP itself is a plaintext protocol dating to RFC 821 (1982). Modern email security relies on layered extensions: STARTTLS (RFC 3207) for opportunistic encryption, MTA-STS (RFC 8461) for enforced TLS, DANE (RFC 7671) for certificate pinning via DNSSEC, and SPF/DKIM/DMARC for sender authentication.
The sending server queries DNS for MX records to discover which servers accept mail for the recipient's domain (RFC 5321 Section 5).
Opens a TCP connection to port 25 on the highest-priority MX server. If unreachable, tries lower-priority servers.
If the server advertises STARTTLS, the connection is upgraded to TLS before any message data is sent (RFC 3207).
MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, and DATA commands transfer the message. The receiver responds with status codes (2xx success, 5xx permanent failure).
STARTTLS (RFC 3207) upgrades a plaintext SMTP connection to TLS without changing the port. However, standard STARTTLS is opportunistic — if TLS negotiation fails, most servers fall back to plaintext delivery. An active attacker can strip the STARTTLS capability advertisement, forcing email to be delivered unencrypted.
The core SMTP specification. Defines the protocol commands, MX record handling, delivery rules, and security considerations for email transport.
Defines the STARTTLS extension for upgrading plaintext SMTP connections to TLS. Basis for all opportunistic email encryption.
Prevents TLS downgrade attacks by allowing domains to publish a policy requiring TLS for inbound email delivery.
Uses DNSSEC-signed TLSA records to pin TLS certificates for mail servers, eliminating reliance on certificate authorities.
Defines a reporting mechanism for sending servers to report TLS delivery failures, complementing MTA-STS and DANE.
Formally deprecates TLS 1.0 and 1.1 due to known cryptographic weaknesses. Servers should support TLS 1.2 minimum.
STARTTLS with TLS 1.3, valid certificate, no open relay, correct PTR, MTA-STS enforce or DANE with DNSSEC
STARTTLS with TLS 1.2+, valid certificate, no open relay, correct PTR
STARTTLS present, minor certificate or PTR issues, no open relay
STARTTLS present but weak TLS version (1.0/1.1) or self-signed certificate
STARTTLS absent or connection failures on some servers
Open relay detected, or no TLS on any reachable server
SMTP connectivity is one layer of email security. For a complete picture, also check your sender authentication records: